Amidst the complex web of challenges facing Pakistan, the nation grapples with a worn economy, volatile internal security, a faltering regional policy, and importantly, heightened political uncertainty. At the heart of this tumultuousness lies one institution: the Pakistan Army.
Its persistent interference in the country’s political affairs and consequent dominance over all other institutions has largely inhibited the establishment of strong and stable civilian democratic institutions in Pakistan. While traditionally tasked with national defence, the Pakistan Army has, over the years, assumed a dual role as both a military and a political actor, exerting influence through its overt and covert involvement in the politics of the state. Despite occasional civilian efforts, it has proved difficult to undo or limit the influence of this deeply entrenched political role of the Pakistan Army.
Several factors contribute to the complexity of addressing the Pakistan Army’s entrenched role. These encompass its extensive economic interests, manifested in numerous commercial enterprises, the fragility of civilian institutions, and deliberate actions to maintain internal security instability. Moreover, it has positioned itself as Pakistan’s most reliable institution in the eyes of foreign powers like the United States and China, thereby securing influence over the nation’s foreign policy.
The Pakistan Army’s intervention in politics dates back to the country’s formative years when it “was tasked with the responsibility of safeguarding the nascent nation and ensuring internal security.” However, this constitutional duty has been historically exploited by the Army to acquire a disproportionate share of national resources, a trend that continues to this day. For instance, when Pakistan acquired $2 billion in financial aid from the United States in 1947, the armed forces received a significant share of $300 million. Similarly, despite Pakistan’s current economic challenges, the military establishment ensured a 13 per cent increase in the annual defence budget from PKR 1.5 trillion in 2022-23 to 1.8 trillion in the 2023-24 federal budget.
Through collusion with other state actors such as civil bureaucracy, judiciary, and various political and religious leaders, the Pakistan Army’s political meddling has manifested in various forms. From orchestrating military coups to directly influencing the appointment of political leaders, it has consistently sought to shape Pakistan’s political landscape through direct and indirect means in accordance with its interests.
This was particularly evident during the recent February 2024 elections when the Pakistan Army not only prevented Imran Khan’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), from securing an electoral majority through elaborate pre- and post-poll manipulation but also ensured the sidelining of Nawaz Sharif in favour of his brother Shehbaz Sharif to safeguard its interests. Such nuanced manipulation underscores the Pakistan military’s adeptness in navigating the complexities of Pakistani politics, ensuring its continued influence within the democratic framework.
The foremost reason for the unending political interference in Pakistan’s civilian affairs largely stems from the Army’s vast network of commercial enterprises it has established over the decades, spanning sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, education, construction, and real-estate sectors. In the broader political economy of the country, the Army-led Pakistan Armed Forces are directly involved in commercial or profit-making ventures or have personal economic interests of its officer class at stake. Pakistani author Ayesha Siddiqa calls this nexus ‘Milbus’, which is the “military capital…used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity, especially the officer cadre, but is neither recorded nor part of the defence budget.” This is significant for the armed forces, given the Pakistan Army has continued with the colonial practice of rewarding its officer class with land and effectively formed a new feudal class.
At the apex of the military’s economic pyramid stands the Fauji Foundation (FF), Army Welfare Trust (AWT), Shaheen Foundation (SF) and Bahria Foundation (BF), all being run in the name of welfare organisations. Not only do all three services of the Pakistan Armed Forces run their welfare organisations with economic subsidiaries, but the military formations and units of the Pakistan Army starting from its Corps till brigades level run their independent commercial ventures.
For instance, Fauji Foundation controls dozens of subsidiaries, such as Fauji Foundation Gas, Fauji Corn Company, Fauji Cement, Fauji Security Company, Fauji Fertilizer, Fauji Sugar Mills, Fauji Foundation Securities (PVT), Fauji Farm Ltd, Fauji Oil, Overseas Employment Services, among others. Likewise, the Army Welfare Trust (AWT), as per 2016 Senate filings of Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, owns over 50 housing projects in the country besides dozens of industrial ventures such as Askari Farms, Askari Rice, Askari Sugar, Askari Fish, Askari Cement, Askari Pharmaceutical, Magnesite Refineries, Commercial Plazas, Askari Guards, Askari Aviation, among others.
Additionally, the Army also controls organisations such as the Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), which is Pakistan’s largest construction company, along with the Special Communication Organisation (SCO), which accord it control and dominance over all other state institutions.
Besides, Pakistan’s Armed Forces own 11.58 million acres of the 93.67 million acres of state land, with the exclusive powers to change its character to private use. Of this military landholding, it has allocated a huge 6.8 million acres, that is 59 per cent, to the individual members of the armed forces, thereby making them the new feudal class of the country. It is this omnipresence across all economic sectors of Pakistan that essentially accords it “an important role for the military in the state and society even if the generals do not directly control the levers of power,” as Pakistani Political Scientist and Military Analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi argues in his book Military, State and Society in Pakistan.
Given these economic entanglements, the Pakistan Army has developed vested interests in the government’s economic policies and hence has felt the necessity to infiltrate the democratic institutions of the country to ensure it retains unchallenged control of and access to state resources. This explains the appointment of retired and serving senior military officers in important civilian institutions such as NADRA, WAPDA, SUPARCO, and CPEC Authority, among others. Not only do these strategic appointments help it tilt the government policies in its favour, but it also ensures that the military itself designs such policies where its interests are at stake.
What is more interesting is how the Army has ensured that its economic empire functions out of governmental accountability mechanisms even as it exploits national resources at the peril of the state economy. This is significant in the current context wherein the country’s economy remains ventilator-ridden, yet the military economy remains unscathed and thriving. For instance, whereas Pakistan’s economy risks a potential external debt default in the absence of new sustained financial support from external creditors, its unaccountable military economy remains thriving with the assets of its enterprises growing to over $20 billion, with entities such as Fauji Foundation worth PKR 9.8 billion and Army Welfare Trust PKR 50 billion.
Given this state of the economy, the Pakistan Army needs a civilian yet feeble façade of government to not only shield its unaccounted assets but also to scapegoat these plaint political leaders for the country’s economic mismanagement.
Intricately related to this is how the Pakistan Army has exploited frequent militant violence and internal insecurity in the country to its advantage. From the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Balochistan, Pakistan has witnessed recurrent violence from many groups that the military establishment has long patronised such as the various factions of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and several sectarian groups. While the Pakistan Army conveniently blames external forces out of convenience, unsurprisingly, it also remains the ultimate beneficiary of this violence in the country’s hinterland.
This insecurity gives the Army carte blanche to retain dominance over the state institutions, as well as to justify its claims over ever-increasing annual budgetary allocations. Increased volatility in Pakistan’s security situation allows the military establishment to pressure the weak political dispensations to allocate an increased share of the federal budget to the armed forces. This was seen in the 2023-24 annual budget allocation when the Shehbaz Sharif government was forced to increase the defence share by 13 per cent despite the near economic collapse of the country.
Therefore, unless and until Pakistan’s political leadership get its act together and brings the independent economic enterprises of the armed forces under the accountability mechanism of the state, the military establishment will ensure its interests remain unscathed and unaccounted for even as it feeds on the national resources. It is this military capital that holds the key to how long the political interference from the military establishment will continue in the country.
There is an imminent requirement of a democratic consensus amongst the political parties towards this end. Instead of competing to be the subordinate partners of the military establishment, the civilian political actors need to go beyond their individual interests to reclaim the civilian governance institutions from the clutches of the Army. Then only can there be a possibility of limiting the role of the Army from the political affairs of Pakistan, if not outrightly ending it in totality.
The writer is an author and columnist and has written several books. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
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