Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), independent India’s first multipurpose river valley project, completes 75 years this week. It apparently came into existence on July 7, 1948 (Ministry of Power, Annual Report 2021-22, P.155). However, N.V. Gadgil, the then Union Minister for Works, Mines and Power, who moved the Damodar Valley Corporation Bill, 1947 in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) recalls the Corporation was inaugurated in April, 1948 (Government From Inside, P.103). After the third reading of the Bill, the Members of the Legislative Assembly representing Bihar and Bengal autographed a copy of the Bill and presented it to the minister as a memento (P.102). The Bill was passed in February, 1948 after an animated debate in the Assembly, whereupon it received the assent of Governor General Lord Mountbatten on March 27, 1948. It set into motion the process of building several other “temples of modern India”, as Jawaharlal Nehru described the multipurpose river planning projects.
Damodar is a short and seasonal river stretching 592 km between Jharkhand and West Bengal before merging into the Hooghly River. It is Ganesha’s trunk in the summer and becomes Ganesha’s potbelly in the monsoon. Its slender stream swells dramatically in a matter of weeks. It was once called the river of “Bengal’s sorrow”, for its destructive potential in Burdwan and Howrah districts. Even Jharkhand was not completely protected from the flood. The plenary session of the historic Ramgarh Congress (1940) had to be abandoned within two hours due to the Damodar floods in Jharkhand (Government from Inside, P.10). In its seasonal behaviour, it bears close resemblance with the Tennessee river in the US.
The DVC, modelled upon Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the US, was not actually the Government of India’s brainchild. It is true that Jawaharlal Nehru, during his maiden trip to the US, visited Knoxville (Tennessee) on October 29-30, 1949, to inspect the TVA, especially the powerhouse at Norris Dam. A black and white photo of Nehru being shown a large wall map of TVA by its Chief Engineer, Clarence Bee, is preserved at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Missouri. Bee explained to Nehru the detailed operation of the system, dealing with flood control, and generation of hydro-electricity.
The actual credit for proposing the TVA model, to curb the ferocity of Damodar, goes to astrophysicist Dr Meghnad Saha (1893-1956). Though he hailed from East Bengal, the land of mighty Padma and Meghna, Saha accidentally got involved in the affairs of Damodar since its graduation days in Calcutta University. He accompanied his Chemistry teacher, illustrious Dr P.C. Ray (1861-1944), whom Gandhi jokingly called “Doctor of Floods”, in the flood relief efforts since 1913. It was in that year Damodar had recorded devastating flood. Saha’s initial interest in Damodar, informs his biographer S.B. Karmohapatro, emerged while participating in the flood relief activity at Tarkeswar and Uluberia area as a volunteer under Krishna Kumar Maitra, the veteran Brahmo Samaj leader (Meghnad Saha, P.84). A decade later in 1923, Saha participated in the flood relief efforts in north Bengal, alongside Subhas Chandra Bose and Satish Chandra Dasgupta.
By 1930s, Saha had formulated his definite opinion on the subject of river planning. His essay viz. Need for a Hydraulic Research Laboratory in Bengal published in Acharyya Ray Commemoration Volume (1932) reveals Saha’s passionate and detailed study of river planning in different countries of the world. The issue of mishandling of Damodar’s flow, at the advent of railways in India, leading to creation of malaria infested swamps in Burdwan did not escape his notice either. It was in that essay, Saha argued in favour of not only a “River Commission but also a laboratory for research in River physics” (ARCV, P.242). His model was Wasserbau Laboratory of Berlin-Charlottenburg or Danube River Commission at Vienna. The River Research Institute of Bengal was actually established in 1942.
In the ensuing year, all hell broke loose with Damodar flood. The flood breached the left embankment of Damodar, thus putting the surrounding villages six to seven feet below water. It damaged the vital infrastructure like G.T. Road and railway tracks, thus jeopardising military communication between General Headquarters of the Army in Delhi and 14th Division engaged in Burma during World War II. Calcutta, which lives under the shadow of Japanese air incursion, was isolated from New Delhi.
It forced the Bengal government to appoint a Damodar Flood Enquiry Committee (1943), under the chairmanship of Maharaja of Burdwan (actually a zamindar) Uday Chand Mahtab, with Dr Meghnad Saha as an important member of the Commission. Though this columnist could not readily trace the Damodar Flood Enquiry Committee Report (1943), he relies on the affirmation of Saha’s colleague and biographer, Kamalesh Ray, to conclude that it was the astrophysicist who first envisaged a river planning of Damodar based on TVA, which will not merely control flood but support irrigation and generate hydroelectricity. Saha’s plan was accepted by the government in formation of Damodar Valley Corporation (The Life and Work of Meghnad Saha, NCERT, P.41).
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Saha, his biographer S.B. Karmohapatra says, had set up a model of the Damodar river in the corridor of his laboratory in Science College, Calcutta. At this stage, the support of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Member (Power and Works) in Viceroy’s cabinet, proved vital for the interim government (1946-47) in adopting a resolution to set up Damodar Valley Corporation on the lines of Tennessee Valley Authority. Saha was friendly to Dr Ambedkar’s Secretary, D.L. Majumdar, and used to discuss the project at length with him. Majumdar was deputed to the Tennessee Valley to study its constitution. Majumdar later drafted the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, which was adopted by the government (Meghnad Saha, P.86).
The services of Dr W.L. Voorduin, a senior engineer at TVA, were obtained by the interim government, despite opposition from the British, to draw up the technical plan. Voorduin planned a series of eight dams at Tilaiya, Deolbari, and Maithon on Barakar; Bermo, Aiyar and Sanolapur on the Damodar, on the Bokaro and on the Konar respectively. A hydroelectric power station was to be attached to each dam, a barrage below Silna, a low diversion dam at Bermo for hydel power generation, and a thermal power generation with an installed capacity of 150,000. The plan envisaged an aggregate controlled reservoir capacity of 4.7 million acre feet, perennial irrigation for an area covering 7.6 lakhs acre and power at peak-load 300,000 KW. Vorduin’s plan provided for navigation facilities and water supply. (Report of the Damodar Valley Corporation Enquiry Committee, 1953, P.10)
The Nehru government did not adequately recognise yeoman services of Saha towards Damodar Valley Project. He was not put in the panel of the Damodar Valley Corporation Enquiry Committee (1952-53), though the Committee did obtain his views on the subject. This was perhaps later compensated by appointing Saha the Chairman of Calendar Reforms Committee (1955), another subject with which Saha was passionately involved.
The initial work of DVC apparently did not inspire Saha’s confidence. In 1952, Saha entered the first Lok Sabha, as an independent member, representing North-West Calcutta constituency. His speech on June 20, 1952, in Lok Sabha exposed several lacunae in DVP. The aforesaid speech was part of discussion on the General Budget 1952-53, in which Saha moved a resolution that the demand for grants under Multipurpose River Schemes (pegged at Rs 27,60,000) be reduced to Rs 100. Similar resolutions were moved by several other members. According to Saha, out of the 12 dams in contemplation under Damodar Valley Corporation, it was said that only four would be taken up, and out of the four, only one dam, smallest in the whole project, had been completed. Saha accused the government of buckling under the pressure of World Bank to prioritise the completion of Bokaro Thermal Power station, whereas a thermal power station was originally envisaged as stand-by. Saha did not like the fact that all consultants working on the DVC project were foreigners. “All that Damodar Valley Corporation” stated Saha, “does is simply to pay the bills and that also not after proper scrutiny. Gross irregularities have been noticed in the work of rehabilitation.”
Saha opined that the DVC project, despite being modelled upon the Tennessee Valley Authority, sadly missed its spirit of the latter. The government was trying to construct a “beehive without providing a queen bee.” While TVA had a capable Chief Engineer like Dr Arthur Morgan, who to his distinction got 11 dams constructed within a short period of five years, the DVC lacked one like him. At Saha’s request, Dr Arthur Morgan had been invited to Damodar Valley while he was visiting India as a member of the Universities Commission. Dr Morgan had apparently found gross irregularities in the method of work and wrote a stinging letter to the Nehru government. The government, however, took no action.
The DVC had actually been without a chief engineer for around two years before Andrew M. Komora accepted the position in October 1950. It was one position for which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had personally taken the interview of a candidate in Knoxville, Tennessee but to no avail. The Report of the Damodar Valley Corporation Enquiry Committee (1952-53) gave a detailed account of the travails involved in appointing a chief engineer. All efforts to find an Indian chief engineer had failed. In the meantime, a lot of money had flown down the Damodar, to use a simile that Saha used.
Finally, the completed Tilaiya Dam was inaugurated by Jawaharlal Nehru on February 21, 1953. The moment is captured in a 10-minute documentary produced by Films Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting titled ‘River of Hope’. According to the documentary, the Damodar Valley project had a mandate for a) flood control b) generating hydroelectricity c) irrigation by means of canals d) developing inland navigation e) increasing industrialisation d) afforestation e) water supply f) developing fisheries g) developing recreational centres near the reservoir sites. It is evident that the original plan has been abridged.
The DVC has four dams — Tilaiya and Maithon on river Barakar, Panchet on river Damodar and Konar on river Konar. Durgapur barrage and canal networks were handed over to the West Bengal government in 1964. The map of DVC shows its spread over mineral rich belt of Jharkhand and West Bengal. The presence of collieries is a mixed blessing as the project has become more about coal and less about water. The DVC, with an eye on financial viability, has disproportionately prioritised thermal power production over hydropower generation. As against three hydel power stations (Panchet and Tilaiya in Jharkhand and Maithon in West Bengal) with a total installed capacity of 147.2 MW, the DVC has seven thermal power stations (Bokaro, Chandrapur and Koderma in Jharkhand; Durgapur, Durgapur Steel, Meija and Raghunathpur in West Bengal) with an installed capacity of 6750 MW. Strangely enough, their largest consumers are power distribution companies of Delhi NCR viz. BSES Rajdhani Power Limited, BSES Yamuna Power Limited, Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited etc. The DVC supplies electricity to as far as Karnataka and Kerala.
Way back in 2003, the DVC had informed the Parliamentary Standing Committee that it had identified a string of new hydel schemes viz. Boro-Konar Hydel, Bermo Hydel Project, Balpahari Dam & Hydro-electricity Project, and Lugu Pahar Hydro Electricity Project (Hydro-Power: A Critique, Forty Second Report, Standing Committee on Energy, 2003, P.41). Clearly, the progress is discouraging in this matter.
The DVC, despite having a command area of 24,235, has not exploited the potential of solar power generation unlike Bhakra Beas Management Board. Nor has it realised its potential in tourism, fisheries or inland navigation. Power generation and distribution has overshadowed other aspects of DVC.
The DVC has registered some success in curbing floods. However, since all the reservoirs were never constructed, its potential water storage capacity was not realised. While it could have curbed the floods more effectively, more water could have been available for irrigation. However, it is not to deny that Damodar’s shallow river bed in West Bengal is also responsible for flooding.
The single minded pursuit of thermal power has its downside. In 2020, Parliament’s Department related Standing Committee on Power had censured “mismanagement in marketing of electricity” by DVC leading to a loss of Rs 1,235 crore in FY19-20. The DVC’s investment in thermal power station at Raghunathpur thus seemed imprudent.
As a public sector undertaking, the DVC is constrained to shore up its revenue and show a positive balance sheet. Being a public sector undertaking, except in special cases, no CAG performance audit is done into its activities. It is for the parliament and policy makers to review the performance of DVC in its 75th year. Way back in 1951-52, the fifth report of the Estimates Committee of Parliament had sounded a wake-up call on the Damodar Valley Corporation, when it was floundering in its initial stages. It was as a result of the report that the Government of India set up the Damodar Valley Corporation Enquiry Committee Report (1952-53). While today, the DVC is in much better and stronger shape, there is ample scope for re-examining whether it has fully served its mandate for which it was set up. Or has India’s Tennessee Valley gone astray?
The writer is author of the book “The Microphone Men: How Orators Created a Modern India” (2019) and an independent researcher based in New Delhi. The views expressed herein are his personal.
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