United States Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin, is due to visit India, just weeks ahead of a Prime Ministerial visit to the United States. In the run-up to the event, the usual, largely Washington-centred analysis on India, has begun in earnest. That’s actually a good thing since no views, in this case, can actually be bad news. Controversy and disagreement is after all the stuff of publicity. Beyond a point, however, it can lead to bad optics for a visiting dignitary. Some recent writing, possibly without any rancour or ill feeling, can be put into this class, which put together, could put some solid upcoming deals in jeopardy, which is no good for either side.
Those value judgements
One such is a paper commissioned by the US Air Force from RAND Corporation which assesses the likely willingness of key US partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific to contribute combat air assets in support of US operations. It assessed the likely behaviour of key countries like Australia, Japan and India and is written by a group of scholars, none of whom are likely to have any particular grouse against India, which makes some of what it says surprising. For one, it assesses reasonably that India would only support the US if its own interests are involved – which is unsurprising and common to almost every country in the world.
The paper then goes on to note that India might consider involvement in ‘potential stabilisation scenarios” such as those involving Islamic extremist groups, particularly on the periphery, ascribing this preference to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist government. This is as short-sighted as it is incorrect. India has resisted attempts to draw it into Afghanistan for instance, and despite being ‘Hindu nationalist’ has made a strong Middle East policy central to its foreign policy agendas. No Indian government has been able to build this with such success.
A similar error in judgement is apparent in an article by Ashley Tellis, who makes the charge that the US has “overlooked India’s democratic erosion and its unhelpful foreign policy choices, such as its refusal to condemn Moscow’s ongoing aggression in Ukraine….. on the presumption that New Delhi will respond favourably… during a regional crisis involving China.” It’s not just the charge of ‘democratic erosion’ – which is dismayingly apparent in the US itself according to Freedom House – but the ignoring of the fact that the US – again like everybody else – has made foreign policy choices in supporting rampant dictators like Fulgencio Batista, Ferdinand Marcos, Mobutu Sese Seko, Augusto Pinochet, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Zia ul-Haq, and Suharto, even as it now courts Mohammad Bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. Countries support others not for benign interests, but for strong policy choices, which lies at the heart of US policy towards India. However, the fact that Tellis, who is no enemy of India and ill deserves the invective thrown at him recently, has made such a comment, means that Delhi needs to carefully examine its public image and the actions that are causing this backlash. A little course correction is no bad thing at any time. As for that tiresome phrase ‘Hindu nationalist’, the Prime Minister of India doesn’t take his oath on a religious text but on the Constitution. The President of the United States does so on a Bible, though there is no such requirement. Yes, India could do some things differently, but it’s really time to shelve that phrase.
Operational judgements
The RAND report, while assessing Indian support to the US, baldly states that such support would only be certain against a land invasion by China. That ignores India’s very real maritime interests – which are not included in the threat scenarios against which a partner’s position is assessed. The paper instead focuses on Taiwan or Korean-related scenarios, (that is, beyond the Malacca Straits) which are obviously of no great interest to India (or most others) given its region-focused capabilities. The point is, what kind of war the US expects to wage against China? Its own commitment to a ‘One China policy’ remains, and the recent G-7 summit statement that calls for ‘constructive and stable relations’ with China doesn’t seem to point to any aggressive behaviour. In addition, any decisions on conventional war will be affected by the reality that China is the second largest holder of US debt ($859 bn in Jan 2023) even while the US economy’s health depends on imports from China, which are more than any other country.
Meanwhile a ‘war’ is already ongoing. In terms of cyber threats, the 2023 assessment of the Director of National Intelligence called it “the broadest, most active, and persistent cyber espionage threat to US Government and private-sector networks”. China makes the same argument. Then there is a continuous underground war in global trade and influence. The ‘Indo-Pacific construct’ versus the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ is just one aspect of a deadly underground war which includes multi-domain intelligence, information warfare, maritime domain awareness, and critical logistics and maintenance. Recently, a second US Navy ship arrived at L&T shipyards for repairs. Don’t forget that the oceans wash the shores of nine states and four union territories. It is a maritime nation by geography, and soon will be by political design.
The ground level
As Ashley Tellis says, the Indo-US defence relationship has progressed by leaps and bounds. And as he says, US companies have so far been reluctant to take manufacturing wholesale to India, due to low domestic demand, making for an inevitable plateauing. But here’s the thing. Boeing opened its plant in China in the height of the trade war and was seen as a major Boeing 737 client since it has ordered more than 160 737 Max’s across 12 carriers since 2013. In 2021, Boeing confirmed 214 Max 737 for Spice Jet and Akasa Air. In 2023, it got its third-largest order in history from Air India for 220 aircraft. That’s just three carriers. Indigo is also showing interest. Boeing is already strongly partnered with the Tata group for the manufacture of fuselages of the advanced Apache helicopters, with the Hyderabad facility to be the sole producer globally, producing vertical fins for the 737 among other things. Clearly, this makes market sense, which means the path ahead for further expansion is ripe, with General Electric as part of the deal. GE has a long history here, though the expected deal to make engines (or at least a considerable part of it) is path-breaking, but also linear in terms of future expectations. Powering LCA Tejas Mk2 is only one part of the story; further down the line is the Advanced Multirole Combat Aircraft, though DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) is in talks with some three countries. If the GE deal doesn’t go through on India’s terms, then it will be a win for Europe.
Meanwhile, while Tellis says accurately that the success of the Initiative for Critical and Emerging Technologies (ICET) depends on US firms loosening up technology sharing, what is often unnoticed is a range of small startups who, as part of a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement ( CRADA), are providing niche technology to the US defence firms, including the US Air Force, and General Atomic Aeronautical Systems in the very areas that are part of the massive ICET list compiled by the White House. That also included partnering for Artificial Intelligence. Its these small but growing tie ups in a rapidly changing ecosystem that will sustain future growth.
It is true that like any other country, India will only weigh in when its own interests are threatened. But as of now — and unlike the past — it is in India’s interest to ensure a strong US presence in the Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future. It would — again like almost everybody else — infinitely prefer if another war did not break out and roil the global economy. Unlike most countries, it has China on its doorstep, and that demands some deft juggling on the world stage, mostly saying one thing and doing another.
But here’s the bottom line. Again for the foreseeable future, a powerful and lustily growing China is not in Delhi’s interest. Period. That’s the real consensus builder in US-India relations. That, and a determination to grow as fast as possible to not just counter a belligerent neighbour, but also deliver to the people who voted this government in. Don’t forget that. It’s the stuff of democracy. The defence secretary will have no trouble remembering that. It’s a few think tanks back home who need to tune in.
The author is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the stand of this publication.
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